Help us make sense of (i) our own existence and (ii) our relationships to one another & our surroundings
These types of explanations can be at the MICRO or MACRO levels, in terms of determining what may [not] be immediately present to us and / or conceptualizing the universe itself
The Mind-Body Problem
The issue of what mental phenomena really are and how they relate to the physical world
Critiques
Do the concepts and categories we use to describe reality influence or determine what we view reality as?
Do these categories and descriptions embody the values of the describer?
To what extent are these value-laden concepts gendered [privileging hegemonic masculinity]?
The notion that there are essentially two fundamentally different kinds of stuff, or substances
Substance Dualism
The notion that mind and body consist of two fundamentally different kinds of stuff, or substances—the mind being of nonphysical stuff and the body of physical stuff
Property Dualism
The view that mental properties are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, physical properties
Against [Substance] Dualism
The idea of a nonphysical thing interacting with a physical thing is mysterious (interaction problem) and implausible (incompatible with scientific inquiry)
Thus, the mind cannot be an immaterial substance that interacts causally with the physical world
NOTE: Certain proposed solutions (e.g., epiphenomenalism) attempt to address the interaction problem by maintaining their respective independence or postulating some external binding force (usually divine)
Materialism / Physicalism
The doctrine that every object and event in the world is physical
Identity Theory
The view that mental states are identical to physical brain states
Logical Behaviorism
The idea that mental states are dispositions to behave in a particular way in certain circumstances
Against Materialism / Physicalism
How can even a very complicated physical system produce mental phenomena that seem to have no physical characteristics?
Infamous thought experiments (e.g., Chalmer's Zombies and Nagel's Bat) aim to demonstrate how inclined we are to maintain that there is something in addition to, or beyond, what the materialist can account for
Post-Materialism
Functionalism
The view that the mind is the functions that the brain performs. I.e., mental states are functions between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs
NOTE: This influential theory has led some philosophers to the view that the human brain is a kind of computer leading to the possibility of conscious A.I.
Eliminative Materialism
Claims that mental conscious states (desires, beliefs, intentions) don’t exist, and that future science will let us eliminate all terms referring to such states
Epiphenomenalism
The notion that mental properties do not cause anything but merely accompany physical processes
Against Functionalism
Similarly, functionalism is committed to such physical systems having mental states like ours if it is functionally equivalent to ours neurologically
Arguments using scenarios like Ned Block’s Chinese brain and John Searle’s Chinese room show that functionalism is dubious, for it seems possible to introduce an appropriate functional organization into a system and still not attain conscious experience or a cognitive capacity