Chapter 1: Introduction: The Global Problem of Religious Harm

• 1.1 The Motivating Puzzle: From Empirical Harm to Structural Flaw

  • This chapter opens with empirical data on the heightened prevalence of abuse and exploitation within diverse religious contexts (e.g., Christian churches, Hindu ashrams, Buddhist communities, Islamic madrasas).

  • It poses the central research question: Are these harms contingent failings of human institutions, or are they the logical consequence of a shared structural characteristic inherent in the epistemic framework of major world religions?

• 1.2 Thesis Statement and Core Argument

  • Formal statement of the dissertation's thesis: Major world religions are structurally oppressive because their core epistemic demand for unconditional deference to an external authority systematically undermines an agent's epistemic autonomy.

  • The core argument is presented: Any system requiring such deference is epistemically oppressive. Major religious traditions require it. Therefore, adherence to these traditions is rationally indefensible and morally fraught.

• 1.3 A Broadened Definition of Key Terms

  • Epistemic Autonomy: The universal capacity for intellectual self-governance, grounded in an agent's justified confidence in their own properly functioning cognitive faculties (reflective self-trust).

  • External Authority: A source of knowledge-claims external to the agent’s own reflective judgment, explicitly defined to include:

    • Sacred Texts & Institutions (e.g., Bible, Church, Qur'an, Ummah)

    • Charismatic Figures (e.g., Guru, Lama, Prophet, Messiah)

    • Tradition & Lineage (e.g., Ancestors, Rabbinic law, Apostolic Succession)

    • Socio-Ethical Codes (e.g., Dharma, Sharia, Confucian Li)

  • Epistemic Oppression: The systematic subjugation of an individual's or group's capacity for rational self-governance.

• 1.4 Scope and Roadmap

  • This dissertation will conduct a comparative analysis of Abrahamic, Dharmic, and East Asian traditions to identify the variant forms of a single underlying mechanism of epistemic oppression.

Chapter 2: The Normative Foundations of Epistemic Autonomy

• 2.1 The Value of Rational Self-Governance

  • A review of epistemological theories to establish the normative value of epistemic autonomy.

  • Deontological Justification: The duty to proportion one's belief to the evidence (Chisholm).

  • Virtue Epistemology: Justification as the product of intellectual virtues (courage, open-mindedness, integrity), with a focus on avoiding intellectual arbitrariness (Zagzebski).

• 2.2 Epistemic Injustice and Authoritarian Systems

  • Fricker's Framework: Application of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice to religious contexts.

  • A Proposed Third Category: Authoritarian Injustice: Defining a distinct form of epistemic injustice where agents are systemically conditioned to pre-emptively distrust their own cognitive faculties and testimony when they conflict with a designated authority.

• 2.3 A Modified Standpoint Theory

  • Adapting standpoint theory (Harding, Hartsock) to argue that those in subordinate positions within religious hierarchies (e.g., women, children, laity, apostates) possess a privileged epistemic standpoint from which to critique the system's oppressive nature, leveraging their lived experience as valid data.

Chapter 3: The Architecture of Religious Epistemic Authority: A Global Typology

• 3.1 A Typology of External Authority

  • This chapter moves from a general definition to a systematic classification of how religious authority is constructed and legitimized across cultures.

  • Type 1: Textual-Institutional Authority: Rooted in claims of divine revelation captured in a sacred text and interpreted by a priestly or scholarly institution (prominent in Abrahamic faiths).

  • Type 2: Charismatic-Personal Authority: Rooted in the perceived enlightenment or divine connection of a single figure, whose personal word becomes law for followers (prominent in guru/lama traditions).

  • Type 3: Traditional-Social Authority: Rooted in the unquestionable weight of ancestral lineage, tradition, or a cosmically-ordained social structure that dictates roles and duties (prominent in Confucianism and caste-based Hinduism).

• 3.2 The Universal Demand and Its Consequence

  • Argues that despite different sources, all three types converge on the same demand: the suspension of the agent's critical judgment as a sign of piety or wisdom, leading to the erosion of epistemic self-trust.

Chapter 4: Comparative Case Studies in Epistemic Oppression

• 4.1 The Abrahamic Model: Textual-Institutional Authority and the Epistemology of Abuse

  • Analyzes how the concepts of an omniscient God, inerrant scripture, and divinely sanctioned institutions (Rabbinate, Church, Ummah) create a powerful structure of authority.

  • Connects this epistemic structure to social reality by analyzing narrative-controlling tactics, the epistemology of grooming (where the perpetrator co-opts the ultimate authority), and institutional betrayal in response to abuse claims.

• 4.2 The Dharmic Model: Charismatic and Social Authority

  • Hinduism: Analyzes the dual authority of the Vedas/Brahmin class (Textual/Social) and the personal authority of the guru (Charismatic), exploring how the guru-disciple relationship becomes a site of absolute epistemic deference.

  • Buddhism: Analyzes the tension between the Buddha's encouragement of self-verification (Kalama Sutta) and the development of institutionalized Buddhism, where deference to a lama or Zen master (Charismatic) and lineage (Traditional) is often absolute.

• 4.3 The East Asian Model: Traditional-Social Authority and Its Tensions

  • Confucianism: Analyzes deference to family, elders, and the state not just as a social good but as alignment with cosmic order, thereby suppressing individual epistemic autonomy for the sake of prescribed harmony.

  • Daoism: Presented as a nuanced case, contrasting philosophical Daoism's radical epistemic resistance with religious Daoism's re-inscription of authoritarian priestly and ritualistic structures.

Chapter 5: Objections and Replies

• 5.1 The Objection from the "Sophisticated Believer"

  • Addresses the claim from non-fundamentalists that they integrate reason and experience.

  • Reply: This position is either an unstable compromise or a functional heresy that implicitly rejects the tradition's core authoritarian claims.

• 5.2 The Objection from Incommensurability

  • Addresses the charge that comparing these vastly different religions is an oversimplification.

  • Reply: The dissertation performs a targeted structural analysis of one specific component—the mechanism of epistemic authority—on which a comparison is valid and revealing.

• 5.3 The Objection from Corrupted Foundational Teachings

  • Uses figures like the Buddha or Jesus to argue that oppressive structures are a corruption, not the essence, of the religion.

  • Reply: Concedes the point for some founding philosophies but argues that the dissertation's critique applies to the institutionalized religion as it is practiced. The consistent development of such structures demonstrates the potent pull of this oppressive model.

• 5.4 The Objection from Proper Functionalism

  • Addresses the Plantinga-style argument that belief in God is rational if produced by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis.

  • Reply: Even if such a faculty exists, it cannot account for the specific propositional content of institutionalized religions, which rely on deference to external, testimonial authority.

Chapter 6: Conclusion: Toward Global Epistemic Liberation

• 6.1 Summary of the Comparative Argument

  • A concise restatement of the thesis, now supported by the cross-cultural evidence showing how different forms of authority produce the same oppressive epistemic effect.

• 6.2 A Constructive Alternative: Critical Deference as a Universal Epistemic Virtue

  • Proposes a positive normative model where deference to any authority (religious, scientific, political) is always provisional, evidence-based, and revocable. This posture constitutes epistemic resistance to authoritarianism.

• 6.3 Implications and Avenues for Future Research

  • Implications: Calls for educational reform focused on critical thinking as a "cognitive immunization" against authoritarianism and for revising child protection policies within religious organizations to presume the risk inherent in their power structures.

Future Research: Suggests extending the analysis to secular "religions" (e.g., nationalism, totalitarian political ideologies) and exploring the neuropsychology of cognitive submission to authority.